The impact of inter-municipal cooperation on local public spending by Frère, Quentin et al.
The impact of inter-municipal cooperation on local
public spending
Quentin Fre`re, Matthieu Leprince, Sonia Paty
To cite this version:
Quentin Fre`re, Matthieu Leprince, Sonia Paty. The impact of inter-municipal cooperation on
local public spending. Working paper GATE 2012-25. 2012. <halshs-00730555>
HAL Id: halshs-00730555
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00730555
Submitted on 11 Sep 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
GROUPE	  D’ANALYSE	  ET	  DE	  THÉORIE	  ÉCONOMIQUE	  	  LYON	  -­‐	  ST	  ÉTIENNE	  	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
W	  P	  1225	  
	  
 
 
	  The	  impact	  of	  inter-­‐municipal	  cooperation	  	  
on	  local	  public	  spending	  
	  
	  
Quentin	  Frère,	  Matthieu	  Leprince,	  Sonia	  Paty	  
	  
	  
Septembre	  2012	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
D
oc
um
en
ts
	  d
e	  
tr
av
ai
l	  |
	  W
or
ki
ng
	  P
ap
er
s	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
GATE	  Groupe	  d’Analyse	  et	  de	  Théorie	  Économique	  Lyon-­‐St	  Étienne	  
	  
93,	  chemin	  des	  Mouilles	  	  69130	  Ecully	  –	  France	  
Tel.	  +33	  (0)4	  72	  86	  60	  60	  	  
Fax	  +33	  (0)4	  72	  86	  60	  90	  
	  
6,	  rue	  Basse	  des	  Rives	  42023	  Saint-­‐Etienne	  cedex	  02	  –	  France	  	  
Tel.	  	  +33	  (0)4	  77	  42	  19	  60	  
Fax.	  +33	  (0)4	  77	  42	  19	  50	  
	  
Messagerie	  électronique	  /	  Email	  :	  	  gate@gate.cnrs.fr	  
Téléchargement	  /	  Download	  :	  http://www.gate.cnrs.fr	  	  –	  Publications	  /	  Working	  Papers	  
	  
	  
1 
 
The impact of inter-municipal cooperation on local public spending 
Quentin Frère 
INRA, UMR1041 CESAER – Université de Bourgogne  
26 bd du Dr Petitjean 
Dijon, France 
quentin.frere@dijon.inra.fr 
 
Matthieu Leprince (corresponding author) 
CREM (CNRS et université de Rennes 1) 
7 Place Hoche 
Rennes, France 
matthieu.leprince@univ-rennes1.fr 
 
Sonia Paty 
Université de Lyon 2, Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007 ; CNRS, GATE Lyon Saint Etienne, 
Ecully, F-69130, France 
paty@gate.cnrs.fr 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of inter-municipal fiscal cooperation on 
municipal public spending, based on the French experience. We estimate a model of municipal 
spending choice using panel data and spatial econometrics for municipalities over the period 1994-
2003. We provide two main results. First, inter-municipal cooperation has no significant impact on 
the level of municipal public spending, which suggests that cooperation does not achieve its goal of 
reducing municipal spending by the sharing of local responsibilities. Second, there are no spending 
interactions between municipalities belonging to the same inter-municipal community. This is in 
line with the goal assigned to cooperation in terms of internalization of spatial externalities. 
However, our results show that benefit spillovers remain highly significant outside inter-municipal 
communities, suggesting that inter-municipal communities remain too small. 
 
 
Keywords: public spending, local governments, inter-municipal cooperation, panel data. 
JEL codes: C2, H2, H4, H7. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1950s, local governments in many European countries (Austria, Sweden, Finland, 
Germany, Switzerland, France…) have been cooperating and nowadays, the encouragement of 
cooperation among local authorities in the provision of local public goods remains on the political 
agendas of many central and local governments (Hulst and van Montfort, 2007). There are several 
reasons for this widespread and persistent phenomenon (see details in e.g. Blume and Blume, 2007). 
First, larger spatial units are expected to be more competitive in a globalized world. Second, as 
governments try to reduce the cost of providing public goods, the achievement of economies of 
scale in the provision of local public services is a strong incentive to cooperate. Third, fiscal 
cooperation allows jurisdictions to internalize spending spillovers: the benefits of public 
expenditure (infrastructure, road building, cultural facilities…) often spread across the boundaries 
of the supplying jurisdiction and affect the welfare of the citizens in neighboring localities.  
Despite frequent claims that cooperation among local governments is a potential solution to 
inefficiencies, there are few studies on that topic. This paper tries to bridge the gap using the French 
experience and provides estimates of the different effects of fiscal cooperation on municipal 
spending decisions between 1994 and 2003. The French case offers a favorable setting for research 
on inter-municipal cooperation. In 1971, there was an unsuccessful attempt by central government 
to force the country‟s municipalities to merge. Since then, and contrary to Belgium, England and 
Germany, for example, the French central government suggests that municipalities should voluntary 
cooperate within larger jurisdictions known as inter-municipal communities or „Etablissements 
Publics de Coopération Intercommunale‟ (EPCI). Thus, municipalities that want to jointly finance 
and provide some public services on a collective basis can create or join a community. These supra-
municipal structures co-exist with the municipal structures but have different responsibilities, 
depending on member municipalities‟ choices regarding the competences to transfer to their 
community. And French inter-municipal communities benefit from a high level of fiscal autonomy 
to set tax rates and to choose the scope of inter-municipal public services.  
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Our central concern is to disentangle the different possible effects of cooperation on 
spending behaviors by municipalities. Our first aim is to investigate how fiscal cooperation 
influences the level of municipal public spending. To our knowledge, very few papers analyze the 
impact of inter-municipal cooperation on municipal decisions although its effect is a priori not 
known. An initial benchmark could be the related papers by Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) and 
Aronsson et al. (2000), which focus on the effect of the overlapping structure of local governments 
on public spending. They estimate the impact of regional spending on the local spending choice and 
find that public goods provided by the higher and the lower levels of overlapping governments tend 
to be complements. Adapting their framework, and focusing on the inter-municipal level as the 
higher local government level, Leprince and Guengant (2002) and Guengant and Leprince (2006), 
using cross-sections of municipal and inter-municipal spending data, show that inter-municipal 
spending has a significant and negative impact on municipal spending. Thus, community and 
municipality public goods tend to be substitutes. However, these last papers use only cross-sectional 
data and either ignore or do not control adequately for spatial interactions between neighboring 
municipalities, although this should be a central concern of the municipal spending model. Indeed, 
fiscal cooperation, among other goals, intends to internalize spending spillovers between 
municipalities of the same community. Therefore, in addition to the study of the possible effect of 
cooperation on the level of municipal spending, our second aim is to develop and estimate models 
of municipal spending that are fully specified: they should include spatial interactions between 
neighboring municipalities, but they also should adequately allow fiscal cooperation to impact the 
nature and the extent of these possible spatial interactions. 
While many empirical papers have investigated the extent of tax interactions between local 
governments, studies on the existence and the nature of local governments‟ interactions in terms of 
spending are scarce. Sollé-Ollé (2006) uses a cross-section of 2610 Spanish municipalities in 28 
metropolitan areas and finds negative spatial dependency between neighboring municipalities‟ 
overall spending decisions. He shows also that this broad result is driven by urban municipalities in 
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the suburbs and that the significance of these spending interactions disappears if the focus is on 
non-urban or city centers‟ spending decisions. Schaltegger et al. (2009) study a panel data set of 107 
Swiss municipalities in the canton of Lucerne and find that in this small metropolitan area, 
horizontal overall spending interactions are slightly significant and positive. However, these 
interactions tend to be highly significant and negative for important categories of spending such as 
education, health, and environment. Revelli (2003) uses cross-sectional data on the spending 
decisions of 238 districts and 34 counties. The dataset allows him to study local governments 
located in non-metropolitan parts of England which have two-tier systems of local government. His 
estimated spending model includes both the overlapping structure of local governments and 
possible horizontal interactions. Empirical evidence shows that public goods provided by 
overlapping local governments tend to be complements, but that when this effect is controlled for, 
the extent of horizontal spending interactions at the lower level of local governments is low, but still 
positive. Using a panel data set of the spending decisions of more than 50,000 inhabitants French 
municipalities, Foucault et al. (2008) provided strong empirical evidence of positive strategic 
interactions between the biggest French municipalities in relation to primary and investment 
spending. However, their empirical model ignores both the possible direct effect of fiscal 
cooperation on the level of municipal spending, and the indirect effect of cooperation on the extent 
of horizontal interactions.  
Lastly, the study that is the closest to ours is led by Ermini and Santolini (2010). They 
investigate the impact of inter-jurisdictional agreements in Italy on the extent of spending 
interactions, focusing on specific categories of expenditures. They find that, for the two spending 
categories where the partnerships are very active – police and road maintenance – strategic 
interactions among jurisdictions in voluntary partnerships are lower than among isolated 
municipalities. This outcome suggests that the benefits of spillovers may be internalized in specific 
cases.  
This survey shows that several institutional contexts and empirical models with spatial 
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interactions have been studied. However, it is difficult to make clear inferences about the effects of 
fiscal cooperation on the level of municipal spending and on the existence and the nature (positive 
or negative) of horizontal spending interactions between neighboring municipalities. We try to fill 
these gaps using a general model of municipal spending choice which combines spatial interactions 
terms and fiscal cooperation terms. Our panel data set of French urban municipalities for 1994-2003 
and the use of spatial econometric techniques allow us to provide two mains results. First, inter-
municipal cooperation has no significant impact on the level of municipal public spending, which 
suggests that cooperation does not achieve its goal of reducing municipal spending by the sharing of 
local responsibilities. Second, there are no spending interactions between municipalities belonging 
to the same inter-municipal community. This is in line with the goal assigned to cooperation in 
terms of internalization of spatial externalities. 
We believe that this paper will contribute to the ongoing debate on the reorganization of sub-
national jurisdictions, not just in France but also in all those countries that favor the creation of 
inter-municipal agreements. Our work promotes the idea that cooperation through the creation of a 
new level of local government (i.e. the inter-municipal community) may reduce spending spillovers 
among cooperating local governments. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the local governments in France. 
Section 3 discusses the empirical design of the estimations and the data. Section 4 presents the 
estimation results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The French institutional context 
French municipalities were subjected to huge change at the beginning of the 1980s. The 
decentralization process introduced in March 1982 and January 1983 greatly modified the 
budgetary choices of local authorities which became responsible for implementing public policies 
on urban infrastructures, economic and social aspects, health, supply of transport for school 
children, first degree education and supply of school equipment, and culture. Prior to the laws on 
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decentralization, municipalities were in charge of general affairs (elections, administrative and civil 
registration, first degree education since the Ferry Law in 1881, local road safety and road 
maintenance). The transfer of additional responsibilities has resulted in municipalities increasing 
their tax receipts and benefitting from higher grants from central government. 
The current French local institutional context is characterized by three tiers of overlapping 
local governments. The lowest tier consists of some 36,600 municipalities; the middle tier consists 
of 96 counties (or “départements”); and at the highest level of local government are 22 regions. 
Municipalities are responsible for local urban services, building, provision of nurseries and primary 
schools, and sport facilities, and maintenance of municipal roads and urban public transport. 
Counties administer social assistance, and maintain the counties‟ roads and middle schools. Regions 
are responsible for the provision of vocational training, economic development and building, and 
high school provision. 
Most local revenues come from taxation (54%) and grants (23%), the rest coming from user 
charges and loans. The local business tax (or "Taxe Professionnelle") is the major source of local 
government tax revenue, accounting for approximately 45% of the revenues derived from direct 
local taxes.
1
 The tax base consists mainly of capital goods and is based on the rental values of 
buildings and of equipment (assumed to be 16% of the cost of the equipment). The remaining three 
taxes are collected from households in the form of residential tax (“taxe d‟habitation”), property tax 
(“taxe foncière sur le bâti”) and land tax (“taxe foncière sur le non bâti”). 
In 1992, 1999 and 2004, three laws were passed relating to local cooperation in France.
2
 
Based on the volunteer principle, neighboring municipalities that want to finance and manage 
collectively some public services can create, or join, a community or EPCI. In practice, 
municipalities decide which local public services (with responsibilities like space planning, 
economic development, transport, environment, etc) will be delegated to the community. The EPCI 
                                                 
1
 This tax was abolished in 2010 and replaced by a territorial economic contribution based on property and value added. 
2
 The law of 6
th
 February 1992 lays the basis for inter-municipal cooperation and was reinforced and simplified by the 
law of 12
th
 July 1999. The law of 13
th
 August 2004 rationalized the inter-municipal map and forced municipalities to 
detail the way they share responsibilities with their community. 
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is governed by a board of delegates elected by municipal councils among their members.
3
 
Therefore, unlike council members in municipalities, “départements” or regions, EPCI officials are 
not directly elected by the population. 
 
3. The empirical design 
In this section, we first discuss the empirical spending model used to estimate the impact of fiscal 
cooperation on municipal spending choices. Second, we describe the econometric method used. 
Third, we present the data used in our study. 
 
3.1 The empirical model of municipal spending 
Here, we describe our empirical strategy to disentangle, in a spatial model, the possible different 
effects of inter-municipal cooperation on local spending. Our three step approach is the following. 
First, we develop the basic spatial model of municipal spending with a single interaction term, as it 
is already done in the related literature (3.1.1). Second, we introduce in that model a direct possible 
effect of fiscal cooperation on the level of municipal public spending (3.1.2). Third, we develop an 
original spatial model with two interaction matrices. This model is able to investigate whether fiscal 
cooperation has an impact on the extent of spending interactions among neighboring municipalities 
(3.1.3). 
 
3.1.1. The basic spatial model of municipal spending 
As a first step, we present a simple municipal model of public spending with spatial interactions 
among local jurisdictions (see Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005). Each municipality i chooses its 
spending level iZ , which is also affected by the level of spending chosen in the other jurisdictions 
jZ . Thus, the municipality‟s objective function can be written:  
                                                 
3
 Each municipality must have at least one seat, and no single municipality can hold more than half of the inter-
municipal council seats. The number of seats held by a municipality is generally proportional to the municipal 
population. 
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),,( ,,, titjti XZZU              (1) 
where iX  is a vector of the characteristics of the municipality i. 
In order to maximize its objective function, the municipality i chooses the spending level that 
satisfies iZU  . Basically, the solution of this maximization problem is a reaction function such 
as: 
),( ,,, titjti XZRZ               (2) 
Thus, the spending decision of the municipality i depends on other municipalities‟ spending 
choices and on the municipality i‟s characteristics. Besides, the sign of the reaction function‟s slope 
can be positive or negative, depending on the properties of municipal preferences (Brueckner 2003, 
p.177). Therefore, the specification of such a spending model can be written as: 
tititjti XWZZ ,,,,              (3) 
where   is a constant term, ti ,  is a random term,   and   are the unknown parameters to be 
estimated.  
The significance of parameter   is expected to reveal whether there are spatial interactions 
between municipalities when they choose their level of public spending. A negative sign of   
would indicate the presence of substantive spending spillovers: the inhabitants of neighboring 
municipalities benefit from the local services provided by the municipality i . In comparison, a 
positive sign of   would reveal local competition, due either to tax base mobility (see Wilson, 
1999, for a survey on tax competition) or to a yardstick competition mechanism (Salmon, 1987; 
Besley and Case, 1995). In the first case, municipalities try to attract a part of their neighbors‟ tax 
base in order to increase their tax revenues, which lead to a race-to-the-bottom of tax rates. In the 
second case, incumbents adopt a mimicking behavior in order to maximize their probability of 
being reelected. But whatever the sources of spatial interactions
4
, this model of municipal spending 
is not satisfactory in the French local government context because it ignores fiscal cooperation 
                                                 
4
 See Redoano (2007) for a methodology to identify the source of such horizontal interactions. 
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between municipalities.  
 
3.1.2. The impact of inter-municipal cooperation on the level of municipal spending  
In a second step, we extend this basic spatial framework in order to investigate the impact of local 
cooperation on municipalities‟ spending choices. First,  we focus on the direct effect of cooperation 
on the level of municipal spending by including a dummy variable Coop. It captures the cooperation 
choice of the municipality, such as Coop is equal to 1 if the municipality i is part of an inter-
municipal community, and equal to 0 otherwise. Thus, a municipality's policy reaction function can 
be written as: 
),,( ,,,, tititjiti XCoopZRZ               (4) 
where Zi,t is the vector of per capita public expenditure of the municipality i at time t; Zj,t is the 
vector of per capita public spending of the neighboring municipalities j at time t; Coopi,t is the 
cooperation variable indicating whether or not the locality belongs to a community, and Xi,t is the 
vector of the socio-economic and budgetary characteristics of municipality i at time t. The equation 
to be estimated then becomes: 
titititjiti XCoopWZZ ,,,,,               (5) 
where   is expected to be negative: a municipality belonging to a community transfers some 
spending responsibilities that are endorsed by its community, and thus, the municipality‟s spending 
level is expected to be lower. This is the transferred charges effect. 
However, such impact of communities on their member municipalities may differ according 
to the magnitude of their expenditures. Therefore, in a second time, we replace the Coop dummy by 
tIZ , , the spending level of the community I at time t. We estimate the following model: 
tititItjiti XZWZZ ,,,,,            (6) 
This allows us to test whether inter-municipal and municipal public goods and services are 
either independent (in the case of a non-significant estimated value of  ), substitutes (which would 
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imply a negative impact of tIZ , ), or complements (which would imply a positive impact of tIZ , ). 
  
3.1.3 The impact of cooperation on the extent of spatial interactions between municipalities 
Besides this direct effect of cooperation on the level of municipal spending, we focus on the indirect 
effect of cooperation on the extent of spatial interactions in municipal spending. To do so, we need 
to refine our analysis by decomposing the spatial interaction term tjWZ ,  used in equations (5) and 
(6). Indeed, the model presented in the previous section rests on the hypothesis that interactions do 
not differ if neighboring municipalities are members of the same inter-municipal community or not. 
However, this hypothesis should be studied more deeply: by sharing some responsibilities, 
municipalities member of the same community precisely intend to internalize spillovers in order to 
improve the efficiency of the local public spending within the community. To study such effect of 
inter-municipal cooperation on the nature and on the extent of spatial interactions, we decompose 
tjWZ ,  into two terms: tj
SAMEZW ,  and tj
OTHER ZW , . The first term ( tj
SAMEZW , ) allows us to estimate 
the impact of the spending of the neighboring municipalities belonging to the same inter-municipal 
community as the municipality i. At the opposite, the second term ( tj
OTHER ZW , ) allows us to 
estimate the impact of the spending of the neighboring municipalities outside the when neighbors j 
do not belong to the same community as municipality i. In other words, we distinguish intra-
community ( tj
SAMEZW , ) and extra-community ( tj
OTHER ZW , ) spatial spending interactions between 
municipalities. 
Using this detailed identification of spatial interactions, we can specify two spatial 
interactive terms, so that the model to be estimated is as follows: 
 tititItj
OTHER
tj
SAME
iti XZZWZWZ ,,,,,,                  (7) 
As cooperation is expected to internalize spending benefit among local governments, we expect a 
lower absolute value for the parameter µ (which measures the extent of intra-community spatial 
spending interactions) than for the parameter  ( which measures the extent of extra-community 
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spatial spending interactions). Similarly to the discussion on   in equation (3), a negative sign of µ 
(resp.  ) will indicate that there are significant spending spillovers among cooperating (resp. non-
cooperating) municipalities. At the opposite, a positive sign would indicate that there are spending 
interactions between neighboring municipalities due either to tax base, or to a yardstick competition 
mechanism. Whatever the sign of the spatial parameters, cooperation is expected to reduce the 
extent of spatial interactions in municipal spending.  
 
3.2 Econometric issues 
The empirical literature on spatial spending model highlights two main econometric issues we have 
to deal with in our estimating strategy.  
First, we need to precise the nature of the spatial interaction phenomenon we analyze in our 
model. This is all the more important that one of the possible effects of inter-municipal cooperation 
on which we focus is an effect on the extent of spatial interactions. Following the empirical 
literature, we choose a geographical definition of neighborhood based on the Euclidean distance 
between municipalities.
5
 This scheme imposes a smooth distance decay, and weights wij are given 
by 1/dij where dij is the Euclidian distance between municipalities i and j for j ≠ I. However, in order 
to make sure that our estimation results are not specific to one (and only one) definition of 
neighborhood, we have checked their robustness by testing various weight matrices. We study three 
matrices: 
- WDIST<20km, where wij = 1/dij if dij < 20km, and wij = 0 otherwise; 
- WDIST<15km, where wij = 1/dij if dij < 15km, and wij = 0 otherwise; 
- WCTG, where wij = 1 if j is contiguous to i, and wij = 0 otherwise; 
All theses weight matrices are standardized so that iw
j
ij ∀   ,1=∑ . 
Note that although our study is based on urban municipalities, we do not limit our empirical 
                                                 
5
 We checked the robustness of this approach and replicated our estimation strategy using a definition of neighborhood 
based on contiguity, implying that wij = 1 if two municipalities share a common border, and  
 wij = 0 otherwise. 
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approach to spatial interactions between these urban units in order to avoid possible border effects. 
Indeed, such a restriction would bias the estimation results: it would implicitly assume that urban 
area are similar to island in the country and that urban municipalities only interact with other 
neighboring urban municipalities, but not at all with neighboring rural municipalities. Therefore, we 
allow spatial interactions to take place between urban and rural municipalities and thus, we use an 
extended definition of neighboring municipalities (see next section for a mapping of these buffer 
areas). More specifically, the neighboring municipalities decisions on spending (either with the W 
matrix in (3), (5) or (6) or with the W
SAME 
and W
OTHER
 matrices in (7)) are computed for urban 
municipalities and for all municipalities (even rural) considered to be neighbors, that is, 
municipalities located within a 20km distance, or within a 15 km distance, or contiguous. 
However, our second approach, where we distinguish intra-community and extra-community 
spatial spending interactions with W
SAME
 and W
OTHER
, raises a second border effect problem. In 
order to illustrate this point, we have depicted the case of two member municipalities of the same 
community: the “Communauté d’agglomération du Grand Dijon” (see Map 1). Those two 
municipalities have four contiguous neighbors, but Talant is located within the perimeter of the 
community, whereas Perrigny is located at the border. Thus, Talant‟s four neighbors belong to the 
same community (municipalities in dark grey on Map 1.1) but none of them is outside the 
community. In comparison, Perrigny has one neighbor that belongs to the same community 
(municipality in dark grey on Map 1.2) and three neighbors outside the community (municipalities 
in light grey on Map 1.2), As a consequence, Talant‟s WSAME matrix is empty when based on the 
contiguity neighborhood definition. This case is more frequent the more restrictive is the 
neighborhood definition. Indeed, if we compare it to the case where we use the 20km neighborhood 
definition (see Map 1.3 and 1.4), W
SAME
 and W
OTHER
 are not empty for both municipalities. This 
point led us to prefer the distance based neighborhood definition rather than the contiguity based 
neighborhood definition in the two regimes approach. 
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[insert Map 1] 
 
Our second econometric issue rests on the endogeneity of our spatially lagged variable. 
Indeed, if localities do react to each others' spending choices, then neighbors' spending decisions are 
endogenous and correlated with the error term ( ). As a consequence, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
yields a biased parameter estimate (Anselin, 1988). Basically, there are two possible approaches that 
provide consistent estimates of the spatial parameters in our equations of municipal spending. The 
first is based on an instrumental variables (IV), two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. It consists 
of finding variables that are correlated with neighbors' fiscal spending choices but uncorrelated with 
the error term. The IV approach suggests the use of the weighted average of neighbors' exogenous 
or control variables (WX) as instruments (Kelejian and Robinson, 1993; Kelejian and Prucha, 1998). 
The second method is based on maximum likelihood (ML). Under this method, a non-linear 
reduced form of the estimated equations is computed by inverting the system. A non-linear 
optimization routine is used to estimate the spatial coefficient.  
In this paper, we compute heteroskedasticity-robust IV/GMM estimators for three main 
reasons. First, as argued before, our main variable of interest (the Coopi,t dummy or inter-municipal 
spending ZI,t) is suspected of endogeneity.
 
 Yet, Fingleton and Le Gallo (2007, 2008) have shown 
that IV/GMM estimators are useful in those cases, where spatial dependence models contain one or 
more endogenous explanatory variables other than the spatially lagged dependent variable (see also 
Elhorst, 2010, p.15). Second, we have chosen a large definition of neighborhood and defined buffer 
zones in order to avoid border effects (see next section for a mapping of these buffer areas). As a 
consequence, neighbors can belong to rural areas that are not part of our initial sample of urban 
municipalities and in that case, the usual ML routines cannot be used. Third, as local public 
spending may be persistent over time, serial correlation can appear. To deal with this issue, we 
could introduce the time lagged municipal spending in our explanatory variables and would obtain a 
dynamic spatial panel a la Arellano and Bond (1991) (e.g. Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Foucault et al., 
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2008). However, as it introduces correlation with the municipal fixed effect, this time-lagged 
dependent variable would have to be instrumented. As we did not find satisfying instruments, we 
have defined individual clusters in order to get estimation results that are robust to arbitrary intra-
group correlation, i.e. to serial correlation in our case (e.g. Arellano, 1987). Finally, if neighbors' 
localities are subject to correlated shocks, we may find a correlation between jurisdictions' spending 
choices. The omission of explanatory variables that are spatially dependent may generate spatial 
dependence in the error term, which is given by the following equation: 
tititi uW ,,,                (8) 
If we ignore spatial error dependence, the estimation of our equations could provide false 
evidence of strategic interaction. In this paper, we have run the usual non-robust and robust 
Lagrange multipliers tests, which confirm the relevancy of a spatial lag model.
6
 
Besides, we control both for individual fixed effect by using the Within difference (each 
variable is expressed in difference to the individual mean), and for year fixed effects by a set of nine 
year dummies. 
  
3.3 Data 
Our study focuses on urban municipalities
7
 located in the French metropolitan areas (pôle urbain 
according to the INSEE
8
). We selected only those urban municipalities that existed from the 
beginning to the end of our period of study (1994-2003), which yielded a sample of 2,895 
municipalities over 9 years and a total of 26,055 observations. Expenditures data come from the 
Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales (DGCL, Ministère de l’Intérieur) for municipal 
governments
9
 and the remaining control variables from French census data. Descriptive statistics 
                                                 
6
 They are not presented here for the sake of place but can be shown upon request. 
7
 This restriction is due to two reasons. First, urban and rural municipalities may present different behavior in terms of 
public policies, and different reactions to cooperation. To cope with that heterogeneity, we focus on urban 
municipalities‟ public spending decisions. Second, there are technical difficulties related to computing spatial 
estimations over the whole country since French municipal governments are about 36,600 municipalities. 
8
 Urban unit with more than 5,000 jobs. 
9
 Expenditures data for inter-municipal communities are not publicly available. They used a proxy according to a 
method already used by Leprince and Guengant (2002): we added for each community the two main sources of 
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are given in Table 1. 
Map 2 shows the spatial distribution of the French urban municipalities that we study in this 
paper. Recall that neighbors‟ spending decisions are computed over our 2,895 urban municipalities 
and also over all municipalities considered as a neighbor, (i.e. located within 20km) to avoid 
possible border effects across urban and rural municipalities. 
 
[insert Map 2] 
 
In line with the literature, we include four socio-demographic controls and two budgetary 
variables that may influence local demand for municipal public goods and services: 
- Population density (Densityi,t) is expected to take a positive sign since a big city may supply 
a high level of local public goods to citizens living within their borders and also to the 
citizens of the neighboring localities;  
- Proportions of the population aged below 14 (Pct_Youngi,t) and above 60 years (Pct_Oldi,t) 
which are presumed to take account of municipal demographic heterogeneity influencing the 
demand for local spending. We would expect these control variables to be associated with a 
positive sign because of the particularly high demand of these two populations for local 
public services; 
- Since we expect demand for local public goods and services to be higher among richer 
citizens (i.e. local public goods are considered to be normal or superior goods, depending on 
the value of citizens‟ income-elasticity), after-tax yearly mean income (Mean_Incomei,t) 
should have a positive impact on the level of municipal expenditures;  
- A municipal tax capacity per capita variable (Tax_Capacityi,t) is included as an explanatory 
variable to control for the fact that wealthier municipalities can afford higher levels of public 
                                                                                                                                                                  
fiscal revenues (accounting for more than 70% of total revenues): tax revenues and central government‟s block 
grants. Re-assignments of inter-municipal tax revenues to municipal governments were controlled for when 
necessary due avoid double counting. 
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spending. Tax capacity is defined and computed by the central government as the tax 
revenues a local government might receive if its local tax bases would be taxed at a tax rate 
equal to the mean tax rates calculated all over the country for the same level of local 
government.  
- A municipal grant variable (Granti,t) that refers to the amount per capita of Dotation Globale 
de Fonctionnement (DGF), the main block grant that each municipality receives from the 
central government according to a national formula that mainly rests on municipal 
population. 
 
4. Results 
We present our estimation results in the following way. In a first step (4.1), we provide results when 
models (3), (5) and (6) are estimated. Model (3) is the basic spatial model of municipal spending 
and ignores fiscal cooperation. Models (5) and (6) introduce the potential effect of cooperation on 
the level of municipal spending. In a second step (4.2), we refine our estimation strategy and 
investigate whether spatial interactions between municipalities are different when we introduce two 
types of matrix in the model to control for the fact that some municipal neighbors belong to the 
same community whereas others do not. This gives us results of the estimation of model (7). 
 
4.1 Baseline Results 
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the model (3) in column (2.1) and then results for models 
(5) and (6) in the following columns. Columns (2.2) and (2.3) include the Coop dummy as an 
explanatory variable to capture the effect of fiscal cooperation on the level of municipal spending. 
Columns (2.4) and (2.5) provide the estimation results including the level of inter-municipal 
spending in the model. In all columns, spatial lag variables with a unique distance matrix W are 
instrumented (see the instruments used in the bottom of Table 2) whereas variables of interest (i.e. 
Coop and ZI,t) are instrumented only in columns (2.3) and (2.5). 
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Estimation results of the basic spatial model (3) indicate that there are very significant 
spatial interactions between municipalities located within a distance lower than 20km. More 
specifically, the estimated spatial lag parameter is 0.744 in column 2.1 of Table 2. This result holds 
with a small variation in the estimated parameter when a direct effect of cooperation on the level of 
municipal spending is introduced in the model (see the following columns in the same table). This 
gives evidence of positive spatial interactions in public spending between municipalities. This is 
consistent with the evidence first provided by Jayet et al. (2002) and Charlot and Paty (2010) when 
different cross-sections of municipal tax rates were studied. However, this is the first evidence given 
with panel data and when spatial interactions in municipal spending are studied for municipalities of 
different sizes included in the same “bassin de vie”. Foucault, Madies and Paty (2008) also found 
positive spatial interactions but focused on a panel of municipalities of more than 50,000 
inhabitants and ignored the possible effect of cooperation on municipal spending.  
Finally, in our spatial model, apart from significant time fixed effects, only two explanatory 
variables appear to be significant: higher income per capita leads to lower municipal spending, 
contrary to what is expected, but with a low level of significance, whereas a higher tax capacity per 
capita leads to higher municipal spending, which is in line with results obtained in previous studies 
on the French case (see Leprince and Guengant (2002) for example). The other potential 
explanatory variables of the model appear to be never significant whatever the specifications used 
in Table 2, but also in Table 3. 
Result 1. Controlling for the possible effect of cooperation on the level of municipal spending, 
our baseline estimation results show that spatial interactions in municipal spending are very 
significant and positive between French municipalities. 
 
Focusing now on the effect of cooperation on the level of municipal spending, we provide 
results in column (2.3) (resp. 2.5) where the possible endogeneity of Coop (resp. the level Z of 
inter-municipal spending) is controlled for. We show that the estimated parameters are never 
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significantly different from zero: local cooperation does not modify the level of municipal public 
spending. This outcome suggests that the single fact for an urban municipality to be a member of an 
inter-municipal community does not lead to significantly different spending behavior, compared to 
isolated municipalities. 
Result 2. Inter-municipal cooperation per se does not have any impact on the level of 
municipal spending. 
 
There are several possible reasons for this result of independence between municipal 
spending and inter-municipal or community spending. First, the community might provide public 
goods not previously supplied by rather small municipalities, such as a public swimming pool: this 
is the “Zoo effect” identified by Oates (1988) (see some French evidence by Frère et al. (2011)). In 
such cases, the scope of municipal public goods is not reduced by inter-municipal cooperation, and 
both levels of public spending are independent. Second, in some cases, there may be two 
phenomena that are compensating for each other (see Leprince and Guengant (2002)). On the one 
hand, local cooperation among municipalities is a more effective means to provide public goods 
that the local authorities concerned were already providing before the cooperation. In such cases, 
the Coop dummy would be significant and negative because the scope of municipal provision is 
reduced by cooperation. On the other hand, municipalities may react to the extended scope of inter-
municipal provision of public goods by improving the quality of the supplied goods and services or 
by extending the scope of their public goods provision to satisfy previously unfulfilled demand. In 
some communities, this municipal behavior might induce a positive impact if the Coop dummy. 
These effects with opposite signs might be compensating producing a non-significant result overall.  
Finally, let us remark that our Result 2 is obtained in a spatial model of municipal spending. 
When the spatial lag variable is omitted (see Table A1 in the appendix), the effect of fiscal 
cooperation on municipal spending becomes significant and negative in our panel approach; in line 
with cross-sectional evidence provided by Leprince and Guengant (2002). However, these 
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significant effects of cooperation are obtained from a municipal model which is incorrectly 
specified, because it ignores significant spatial interactions in spending, leading to biased estimation 
results. Introducing spatial effects correctly and testing alternative weight matrices in spending 
models designed to study the effects of inter-municipal cooperation is thus of central concern for the 
rest of our paper. 
 
4.2 Municipal spending models where cooperation impacts the extent of spatial interactions 
Our baseline Results 1 and 2 suggest significant spatial interactions in municipal spending and a 
non-significant effect of fiscal cooperation on the level of municipal spending. However, the spatial 
nature of our spending model must be more deeply studied so that the robustness of our first results 
is tested. We investigate that question in two steps. 
First, we want to make sure that different weight matrices would lead to the same results. 
Indeed, our spatial models rest on one weight matrix that defines neighbors as municipalities 
located in a distance lower than 20km. To provide robustness checks, we thus estimated our models 
with two other matrices: one matrix with a 15km distance, and one contiguity matrix, where 
neighbors are the only municipalities that share a common border with the urban municipalities 
under scrutiny in our study.  
Results are given in the Appendix; in Table A2 with the 15 km distance and in Table A3 with 
the continuity matrix. They provide two new insights. First, whatever the matrices used, Result 2 
remains valid: the impact of cooperation on the level of municipal expenditures is never significant. 
The estimation of the direct impact of cooperation on municipal spending is thus not dependent on 
the way spatial interactions are modeled. However, concerning Result 1, these new tables suggest 
that the definition of the spatial weights matters. First, the 15km distance matrix leads to spatial 
interactions that remain significant but with a somewhat lower absolute value of the spatial lag 
parameter. Second, the contiguity matrix leads to non-significant spatial interactions, the rests of the 
model being stable with the Tax capacity variable remaining the main significant variable. These 
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results obtained when the distance between urban municipalities and their neighbors declines 
contradict our a priori according to which the lower the distance between urban units, the higher 
spatial interactions.  
These results suggest the need to carefully examine the nature of spatial interactions in our 
model. Our hypothesis is that spatial models used in the beginning of this paper neglect a second 
effect of cooperation on municipal behavior. More specifically, the models (3) to (6) rest on the 
hypothesis that interactions do not differ if neighboring municipalities are members of the same 
inter-municipal community. Our intend here is to analyze more deeply this hypothesis since 
members of the same community share spending responsibilities and intend to internalize benefit 
spillovers so that local public spending in the community is more efficient. Cooperation thus 
intends not only to reduce the level of municipal spending, but also to internalize spatial 
externalities. In other terms, cooperation should play a role in the nature and in the extent of spatial 
interactions between neighboring municipalities. 
To study the possible effect of cooperation on spatial interactions, we decompose tjWZ ,  into 
two terms, tj
SAMEZW ,  and tj
OTHER ZW , . As explained in section 3, the estimation of the tj
SAMEZW ,  
parameter allows us to estimate the impact on urban municipalities i of neighboring municipal 
spending only if the neighbors j are included in the same inter-municipal community as 
municipality i: thus, these spatial interactions come from intra-community interactions between 
municipalities belonging to the same community. The second term tj
OTHER ZW ,  allows us to estimate 
the impact of neighboring municipalities when neighbors j do belong to the same community as 
municipality i. This is the model (7) presented in section 3.  
Results are displayed in Table 3. While the rest of the model remains stable, with a 
significant impact of the tax capacity variable, and a non-significant impact of cooperation on the 
level of municipal spending, the distinction between the two types of spatial interactions strongly 
modifies the estimation results in a way that is more in line with expectations. When the possible 
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endogeneity of the variables Coop, (or Zit) and tj
SAMEZW ,  and tj
OTHER ZW ,  is accounted for, in 
columns (3.3) and (3.5), results greatly support our hypothesis that cooperation modifies the nature 
of spatial interactions between municipalities in their spending behaviors. Indeed, the estimated 
coefficient of tj
SAMEZW ,  is not significant in these columns. 
Result 3. There are no spending interactions between municipalities belonging to the same 
inter-municipal community. Inter-municipal cooperation seems to internalize spending 
spillovers among cooperating local governments. 
 
The absence of spending interactions between neighbors in the same community may be one 
of the main consequences of the decrease in responsibilities when municipalities belong to a 
community. This is the expected result of internalization of spatial externalities, either in terms of 
benefit spillovers or in terms of incentives to copy cat neighbors (in tax competition or in yardstick 
competition models). Therefore, our results suggest that cooperation partially achieves its goals: 
while it fails to significantly reduce the level of municipal spending (see Result 2), it might be 
effective in reducing spatial externalities between municipalities of the same community (Result 3) 
On the other hand, the estimated parameter of tj
OTHER ZW ,  is significant and negative. This 
suggests the existence of significant spending spillovers among neighboring municipalities that do 
not belong to the same community. Since the coefficient is negative, spatial interactions among 
local governments cannot be induced by yardstick competition or spending competition over a 
mobile tax base. Similar to results obtained by other studies (see, e.g. Solé-Ollé (2006) or 
Schaltegger et al. (2009)) when studying local government behaviors in spatial models, this result 
confirms that there are strong spending interactions among neighboring municipalities outside inter-
municipal communities.  
Result 4. Benefit spillovers between municipalities that do not belong to the same community 
remain significant, suggesting that inter-municipal communities remain too small. 
22 
 
 
This result is in line with a well known special report by the Cour des Comptes (2005), 
according to which the number of municipalities being member of the same community, especially 
in urban areas, is too low so that inter-municipal communities are not able to internalize the whole 
extent of benefit spillovers between municipalities. This is why a recent law passed in 2010 
recommends to merge communities, and even forces the smaller ones of less than 5,000 inhabitants 
to do it.  
[insert Table 3] 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Inter-municipal cooperation is a widespread phenomenon occurring in most European countries but 
its different effects on municipal choices are not a priori known since it might combine reduced 
costs due to economies of scale, internalization of spending spillovers, and reduced tax competition, 
among other expected effects. 
The main aim of this paper was to test the impact of inter-municipal cooperation on 
municipal spending behavior. We estimated a model of municipal spending choice using panel data 
for the period 1994-2003. We found that inter-municipal cooperation does not have per se any 
impact on the level of municipal spending, contrary to what was expected from the sharing of local 
responsibilities between municipalities belonging to the same community. We also found that inter-
municipal cooperation internalizes spending spillovers among municipalities in the same 
community. However, benefit spillovers between municipalities that do not belong to the same 
community remain significant, suggesting that inter-municipal communities remain too small.  
We believe that this paper will contribute to the ongoing debate on the reorganization of sub-
national jurisdictions since our work promotes the idea that cooperation through the creation of a 
new level of local government (i.e. the inter-municipal community) may reduce spending spillovers 
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among cooperating local governments. 
Future work could extend the research described here, in various ways. For example, we 
could investigate whether the results change if we consider different categories of public 
expenditures.
24 
 
References 
Anselin L (1988) Spatial econometrics: Methods and models. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Dordrecht 
Arellano M (1987) Computing robust standard errors for within-group estimators. Oxford Bulletin 
of Economics and Statistics 49: 431-434 
Arellano M and Bond S (1991) Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an 
application to employment equations. The Review of Economic Studies 58: 277 – 297 
Aronsson T, Lundberg J, Wikstrom M (2000) The impact of regional public expenditure on the 
local decision to spend. Regional Science and Urban Economics 30: 185-202 
Besley TJ, Case A (1995) Incumbent behavior: Vote-seeking, tax-setting, and yardstick 
competition. The American Economic Review 85: 25-45 
Blume L, Blume T (2007) The economic effects of local authority mergers: empirical evidence for 
German city regions. Annals of Regional Science 41: 689-713 
Brueckner JK (2003) Strategic interaction among governments: An overview of empirical studies. 
International Regional Science Review 26: 175-188 
Cassette A, Paty S (2006) La concurrence fiscale entre communes est-elle plus intense en milieu 
urbain qu‟en milieu rural ? Cahiers d’Economie et Sociologie Rurales 78: 5-30 
Charlot S, Paty S, Piguet V (2009) Intercommunalité et fiscalité directe locale. Economie et 
Statistique 415: 121-140 
Charlot S, Paty S, Piguet V (2010) The effects of fiscal cooperation on local taxation: The French 
case. CESAER-INRA Working Paper No. 2010-1 
Cour des comptes (2005), L’intercommunalité en France; La documentation française, 370 pages. 
Devereux MP, Lockwood B, Redoano M (2007) Horizontal and vertical indirect tax competition: 
Theory and some evidence from the USA. Journal of Public Economics 91: 451-479  
Elhorst JP (2010) Applied spatial econometrics: Raising the bar. Spatial Economic Analysis 5: 9-28 
Ermini B, Santolini R (2010) Local expenditure in Italian municipalities. Do local council 
partnerships make a difference? Local Government Studies 36: 655-677 
Fingleton B, Le Gallo J (2007) Finite sample properties of estimators of spatial modles with 
autoregressive, or moving average disturbances and system feedback, Annales d’économie et 
de statistiques 87-88: 39-62 
Fingleton B, Le Gallo J (2007) Estimating spatial models with endogenous variables, a spatial lag 
and spatially dependent disturbances: finite sample properties. Papers in Regional Science 87: 
319-339 
Frère Q, Hammadou H, Paty S (2011) Range of local public services and population size: Is there a 
25 
 
“zoo effect” in French jurisdictions? Louvain Economic Review 77: 87-104  
Foucault M, Madies T, Paty S (2008) Public spending interactions and local politics. Public Choice 
135: 57-80 
Guengant A, Leprince M (2006) Évaluation des effets des régimes de coopération intercommunale 
sur les dépenses publiques locales. Économie et prévisions 175: 79-99 
Hulst R, van Montfort A (eds) (2007) Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Europe. Amsterdam: 
Springer.  
Kelejian HH, Robinson DP (1993) A suggested method of estimation for spatial interdependent 
models with autocorrelated errors, and an application to a county expenditure country police 
expenditure. Papers in Regional Science 72: 297-312 
Kelejian HH, Prucha IR (1998) A generalized spatial two-stage least squares procedure for 
estimating a spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances. Journal of Real 
Estate Finance and Economics 17: 99-121 
Leprince M and Guengant A (2002) Interactions fiscales verticales et réaction des communes à la 
coopération intercommunale. Revue Economique 53: 525-535 
Oates WE (1988) On the measurement of congestion in the provision of local public goods. Journal 
of Urban Economics 24: 85-94 
Redoano M (2007). Fiscal interactions among European countries. Does the EU matter? CESifo 
working paper n°1952 
Revelli F (2003) Reaction or interaction? Spatial process identification in multi-tiered government 
structures. Journal of Urban Economics 53: 29-53 
Revelli F (2005) On spatial public finance empirics. International Tax and Public Finance 12: 475-
492. 
Salmon P (1987) Decentralization as an incentive scheme. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 3: 
24-43 
Schaltegger CA, Torgler B, Zemp S (2009) Central city exploitation by urban sprawl? Evidence 
from Swiss local communities. QUT School of Economics and Finance Working Paper No. 
246 
Solé-Ollé A (2006) Expenditure spillovers and fiscal interactions: Empirical evidence from local 
governments in Spain. Journal of Urban Economics 59: 32-53. 
Turnbull GK, Djoundourian S (1993) Overlapping jurisdictions: Substitutes or complements? 
Public Choice 75: 231-245 
Veiga L, Veiga F (2007) Political business cycles at the municipal level. Public Choice, 131: 45-64 
Wilson JD (1999) Theories of tax competition. National Tax Journal 52: 269-304 
 
26 
 
 
Appendix 
 
 
[insert Table A1] 
 
 
[insert Table A2] 
 
 
[insert Table A3] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, 1994-2003 
Description Symbol Mean Std dev. Min Max
log (municipality's expenditure in hundred € p.c.) Z i,t 2.34 0.48 -1.57 5.45
W
DIST<20km * log (municipality's expenditure in hundred € p.c.) W Z i,t 2.19 0.27 1.45 4.14
W
SAME, DIST<20km * log (municipality's expenditure in hundred € p.c.) WSAME  Z i,t 1.39 1.11 0.00 3.79
W
OTHER, DIST<20km * log (municipality's expenditure in hundred € p.c.) WOTHER  Z i,t 2.16 0.29 0.00 4.14
cooperation dummy Coop i,t 0.62 0.48 0.00 1.00
log(community's expenditure in hundred € p.c. + 1) Z I,t 0.51 0.55 0.00 3.10
log (population density) Density i,t 6.15 1.23 2.84 10.11
log (proportion of the population below 14 y.o. + 1) Pct_Young i,t 0.18 0.03 0.09 0.33
log (proportion of the population above 60 y.o. + 1) Pct_Old i,t 0.17 0.04 0.02 0.38
log (after-tax yearly mean income) Mean_income i,t 5.16 0.27 4.17 6.90
log (tax capacity in hundred € p.c. + 1) Tax_capacity i,t 1.80 0.49 0.00 4.40
log (grants received by the municipality in hundred € p.c. + 1) Grant i,t 0.95 0.28 0.00 2.26
Number of municipalities 2,895
Number of observations 28,950
Monetary terms are expressed in constant euros, base 2005.  
 
 
Map 2. Spatial distribution of the French urban municipalities studied and their neighbors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
French urban municipalities studied (2,895) 
French non-urban municipalities within 
20km distance from the studied 
municipalities (23,142) 
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Map 1. Contiguity matrix vs. distance based matrix in the refined model:  
An illustrative example with the “Communauté d’agglomération du Grand Dijon” 
          Map 1.1. W
CTG
: The case of Talant                  Map 1.2. W
CTG
: The case of Perrigny 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Map 1.3. W
DIST<20km
: The case of Talant          Map 1.4. W
DIST<20km
: The case of Perrigny 
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Table 2. Estimation results of the simple spatial model of municipal spending  
using a distance based weight matrix with a threshold at 20km, 1994-2003. 
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5
Methodology & weight matrix
GMM-cluster GMM-cluster GMM-cluster GMM-cluster GMM-cluster
W
DIST<20km
W
DIST<20km
W
DIST<20km
W
DIST<20km
W
DIST<20km
Parameter estimates (P-values)
W Z j,t 0.744*** 0.740*** 0.775** 0.744*** 0.703**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.023) (0.002) (0.024)
Coop i,t - -0.002 0.019 - -
- (0.715) (0.899) - -
Z I,t - - - 0.001 -0.029
- - - (0.927) (0.839)
Density i,t -0.037 -0.036 -0.038 -0.037 -0.037
(0.614) (0.616) (0.604) (0.615) (0.609)
Pct_Young i,t 0.315 0.318 0.291 0.315 0.304
(0.337) (0.333) (0.438) (0.337) (0.360)
Pct_Old i,t 0.127 0.127 0.126 0.127 0.123
(0.652) (0.652) (0.652) (0.651) (0.664)
Mean_Income i,t -0.051* -0.051* -0.052* -0.051* -0.050*
(0.061) (0.062) (0.064) (0.061) (0.070)
Tax_Capacity i,t 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.123***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Grant i,t 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.020
(0.633) (0.634) (0.629) (0.633) (0.637)
Year_Fixed_Effects t yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
General statistics
Number of clusters 2 895 2 895 2 895 2 895 2 895
Number of observations 28 950 28 950 28 950 28 950 28 950
Validity of instruments
Hansen J statistic
# 2.304 2.310 2.260 2.306 2.274
(0.512) (0.511) (0.323) (0.511) (0.321)
1
st
 step R-squares
W Z j,t 0.4316 0.4322 0.4316 0.4317 0.4316
Coop i,t - - 0.2217 - -
Z I,t - - - - 0.2831  
p-values in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
(2.1) to (2.5) instruments: spatial lag with the W
DIST<20km
 weight matrix of pct_young, pct_old, mean_income, grant. 
#
 The Hansen J statistic follows a chi-squared distribution under the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid 
instruments, i.e. that they are uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded 
from the estimated equation. Besides, this statistic is robust to within cluster correlation. In our results, we are always 
in the acceptance region, what allows us to conclude that our sets of instruments are always valid. 
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Table 3. Estimation results of the refined spatial model of municipal spending  
using a distance based weight matrix with a threshold at 20km, 1994-2003. 
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
Methodology & weight matrix
GMM-cluster GMM-cluster GMM-cluster GMM-cluster GMM-cluster
W
DIST<20km
W
DIST<20km
W
DIST<20km
W
DIST<20km
W
DIST<20km
Parameter estimates (P-values)
W
SAME
 Z j,t -0.006* 0.049** 0.029 -0.005 0.022
(0.058) (0.021) (0.183) (0.219) (0.266)
W
OTHER
 Z j,t -0.224** -0.147 -0.164* -0.232** -0.360***
(0.013) (0.125) (0.086) (0.012) (0.006)
Coop i,t - -0.122*** -0.078 - -
- (0.010) (0.107) - -
Z I,t - - - -0.006 -0.148
- - - (0.648) (0.153)
Density i,t 0.081 0.057 0.064 0.081 0.070
(0.263) (0.429) (0.374) (0.260) (0.343)
Pct_Young i,t 0.426 0.432 0.435 0.421 0.306
(0.205) (0.194) (0.193) (0.210) (0.378)
Pct_Old i,t 0.380 0.364 0.353 0.378 0.338
(0.184) (0.200) (0.213) (0.186) (0.242)
Mean_Income i,t -0.041 -0.040 -0.040 -0.041 -0.036
(0.140) (0.154) (0.154) (0.141) (0.209)
Tax_Capacity i,t 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.131***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Grant i,t 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.0122
(0.737) (0.739) (0.717) (0.736) (0.783)
Year_Fixed_Effects t yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
General statistics
Number of clusters 2 895 2 895 2 895 2 895 2 895
Number of observations 28 950 28 950 28 950 28 950 28 950
Validity of instruments
Hansen J statistic
# 5.464 1.773 2.993 5.326 3.251
(0.362) (0.621) (0.559) (0.377) (0.517)
1
st
 step R-squares
W
SAME
 Z j,t 0.9752 0.9752 0.9752 0.9752 0.9752
W
OTHER
 Z j,t 0.3854 0.3849 0.3854 0.3859 0.3854
Coop i,t - - 0.9988 - -
Z I,t - - - - 0.6496  
p-values in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
(3.1), (3.3), (3.4), (3.5) instruments: spatial lag with the W
SAME
 weight matrix of pct_young, mean_income, tax_capacity, 
grant; spatial lag with the W
OTHER
 weight matrix of density, pct_young, tax_capacity. 
(3.2) instruments: spatial lag with the W
SAME
 weight matrix of tax_capacity, grant; spatial lag with the W
OTHER
 weight 
matrix of density, pct_young, tax_capacity. 
#
 The Hansen J statistic follows a chi-squared distribution under the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid 
instruments, i.e. that they are uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded 
from the estimated equation. Besides, this statistic is robust to within cluster correlation. In our results, we are always 
in the acceptance region, what allows us to conclude that our sets of instruments are always valid. 
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Appendix A1. Estimation results without spatial interactions, 1994-2003. 
A1.1 A1.2 A1.3 A1.4 A1.5
Methodology & weight matrix
Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
W
DIST<20km
W
DIST<20km
W
DIST<20km
W
DIST<20km
W
DIST<20km
Parameter estimates (P-values)
Coop i,t - -0.008 -0.300** - -
- (0.174) (0.023) - -
Z I,t - - - -0.005 -0.466***
- - - (0.600) (0.008)
Density i,t 0.056 0.055 0.023 0.055 -0.047
(0.428) (0.435) (0.773) (0.438) (0.589)
Pct_Young i,t 0.363 0.370 0.662* 0.361 0.215
(0.280) (0.270) (0.087) (0.282) (0.567)
Pct_Old i,t 0.353 0.351 0.259 0.350 0.038
(0.214) (0.218) (0.423) (0.219) (0.911)
Mean_Income i,t -0.044 -0.044 -0.035 -0.044 -0.035
(0.111) (0.113) (0.225) (0.112) (0.230)
Tax_Capacity i,t 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.134*** 0.128*** 0.145***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Grant i,t 0.019 0.019 0.016 0.019 0.018
(0.656) (0.656) (0.746) (0.656) (0.722)
Year_Fixed_Effects t yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
General statistics
Number of clusters 2 895 2 895 2 895 2 895 2 895
Number of observations 28 950 28 950 28 950 28 950 28 950
Validity of instruments
Hansen J statistic
# - - 2.964 - 0.997
- - (0.227) - (0.607)
1
st
 step R-squares
Coop i,t - - 0.2212 - -
Z I,t - - - - 0.2805  
p-values in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
(A1.3), (A1.5) instruments: spatial lag with the W
DIST<20km
 weight matrix of pct_old, tax_capacity, grant. 
#
 The Hansen J statistic follows a chi-squared distribution under the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid 
instruments, i.e. that they are uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded 
from the estimated equation. Besides, this statistic is robust to within cluster correlation. In our results, we are always 
in the acceptance region, what allows us to conclude that our sets of instruments are always valid. 
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Appendix A2. Estimation results of the simple spatial model of municipal spending 
using a distance based weight matrix with a threshold at 15km, 1994-2003. 
A2.1 A2.2 A2.3 A2.4 A2.5
Methodology & weight matrix
GMM-cluster GMM-cluster GMM-cluster GMM-cluster GMM-cluster
W
DIST<15km
W
DIST<15km
W
DIST<15km
W
DIST<15km
W
DIST<15km
Parameter estimates (P-values)
W Z j,t 0.640*** 0.637*** 0.737** 0.637*** 0.562*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.021) (0.007) (0.089)
Coop i,t - -0.003 0.063 - -
- (0.600) (0.650) - -
Z I,t - - - -0.002 -0.062
- - - (0.803) (0.729)
Density i,t -0.027 -0.027 -0.032 -0.027 -0.030
(0.707) (0.709) (0.667) (0.707) (0.688)
Pct_Young i,t 0.350 0.355 0.274 0.349 0.325
(0.285) (0.279) (0.460) (0.287) (0.334)
Pct_Old i,t 0.158 0.157 0.160 0.157 0.144
(0.574) (0.576) (0.566) (0.575) (0.614)
Mean_Income i,t -0.048* -0.048* -0.051* -0.048* -0.046*
(0.077) (0.078) (0.069) (0.078) (0.095)
Tax_Capacity i,t 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.125***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Grant i,t 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.024 0.023
(0.572) (0.573) (0.543) (0.572) (0.589)
Year_Fixed_Effects t yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
General statistics
Number of clusters 2 895 2 895 2 895 2 895 2 895
Number of observations 28 950 28 950 28 950 28 950 28 950
Validity of instruments
Hansen J statistic
# 2.140 2.165 1.854 2.132 2.054
(0.544) (0.539) (0.396) (0.545) (0.358)
1
st
 step R-squares
W Z j,t 0.3720 0.3726 0.3720 0.3720 0.3720
Coop i,t - - 0.2216 - -
Z I,t - - - - 0.2815  
p-values in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
(A2.1) to (A2.5) instruments: spatial lag with the W
DIST<15km
 weight matrix of pct_young, pct_old, mean_income, grant. 
#
 The Hansen J statistic follows a chi-squared distribution under the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid 
instruments, i.e. that they are uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded 
from the estimated equation. Besides, this statistic is robust to within cluster correlation. In our results, we are always 
in the acceptance region, what allows us to conclude that our sets of instruments are always valid. 
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Appendix A3. Estimation results of the simple spatial model of municipal spending 
using a contiguity matrix, 1994-2003. 
A3.1 A3.2 A3.3 A3.4 A3.5
Methodology & weight matrix
GMM-cluster GMM-cluster GMM-cluster GMM-cluster GMM-cluster
W
CTG
W
CTG
W
CTG
W
CTG
W
CTG
Parameter estimates (P-values)
W Z j,t 0.097 0.095 -0.788 0.093 -0.389
(0.739) (0.746) (0.342) (0.751) (0.474)
Coop i,t - -0.008 0.348 - -
- (0.220) (0.287) - -
Z I,t - - - -0.005 -0.545
- - - (0.578) (0.288)
Density i,t 0.048 0.047 0.152 0.047 -0.027
(0.519) (0.524) (0.228) (0.525) (0.820)
Pct_Young i,t 0.378 0.386 -0.004 0.375 0.158
(0.256) (0.246) (0.994) (0.259) (0.713)
Pct_Old i,t 0.335 0.332 0.645 0.333 0.089
(0.238) (0.243) (0.140) (0.242) (0.824)
Mean_Income i,t -0.047* -0.046* -0.052 -0.047* -0.030
(0.091) (0.093) (0.164) (0.092) (0.357)
Tax_Capacity i,t 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.118*** 0.126*** 0.145***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Grant i,t 0.015 0.015 -0.005 0.015 0.005
(0.721) (0.724) (0.929) (0.723) (0.920)
Year_Fixed_Effects t yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
General statistics
Number of clusters 2 895 2 895 2 895 2 895 2 895
Number of observations 28 950 28 950 28 950 28 950 28 950
Validity of instruments
Hansen J statistic
# 4.245 4.289 0.799 4.218 2.289
(0.236) (0.232) (0.371) (0.239) (0.318)
1
st
 step R-squares
W Z j,t 0.1816 0.1819 0.1798 0.1816 0.1816
Coop i,t - - 0.2193 - -
Z I,t - - - - 0.2784  
p-values in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
(A3.1), (A3.2), (A3.4), (A3.5) instruments: spatial lag with the W
CTG
 weight matrix of pct_young, pct_old, mean_income, 
grant. 
(A3.3) instruments: spatial lag with the W
CTG
 weight matrix of pct_young, mean_income, grant. 
#
 The Hansen J statistic follows a chi-squared distribution under the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid 
instruments, i.e. that they are uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded 
from the estimated equation. Besides, this statistic is robust to within cluster correlation. In our results, we are always 
in the acceptance region, what allows us to conclude that our sets of instruments are always valid. 
 
